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for and response to strategic shocks is a challenging undertaking, one for which our nation is currently ill-prepared. This paper defines and examines strategic shocks and threats of context, presenting examples of each and their impacts, examines the challenges the U.S. Government experiences in planning to prevent or mitigate the effects of strategic shocks arising from threats of context, and provides recommendations on how it can improve its ability to effectively manage our nation's future security challenges.
Strategic Shock: Managing the Strategic Gap
If such scenarios are sufficiently plausible and sufficiently worrisomeposing a credible and serious threat to American security-then senior national security decision makers should devote time and resources to address them.
-Andrew Krepinovitch 1 
Military Futurist
In the fall of 1991, the George H.W. Bush cabinet struggled to develop policy responses to the collapse of the Soviet Union-a "strategic shock" that had caught the Bush administration and much of the world by surprise. The United States had faced its Cold War enemy since the end of World War II and developed, over time, an effective strategy of containment in response to the threat posed by the Soviet Union and its efforts to spread communism. 2 The U.S. Department of Defense had developed strategic plans to militarily respond to myriad Soviet military actions, up to and including nuclear war, and had built a well trained and well equipped military establishment whose primary focus was to contain Soviet expansion and deter a cataclysmic nuclear war. Despite decades of intense study of the Soviet system and suggestions that the internal inconsistencies it contained might one day cause the dissolution of the union, the U.S. Government did not possess a strategy to deal with the demise of the Soviet Union, the resultant newly independent states, or the transformed international environment. 3 In the months and years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. The U.S. Government, through its Department of Defense, is adept at conducting strategic planning for conventional military threats that can be categorized as defenserelevant threats of purpose or threats posed by hostile design or intention. 5 The U.S.
has struggled to forecast and conduct effective strategic planning to prepare for and respond to strategic shocks that are caused by unconventional threats, particularly those that develop from threats of context arising from conditions common to the environment itself. 6 Unconventional shocks are the likeliest and most dangerous shocks that will occur in the future and often arise from the analytical "gap" that separates planning conducted for conventional contingency events and events that some would categorize as highly speculative because of their low likelihood of occurrence. This paper will define and examine strategic shocks and threats of context, present examples of each and their impacts, examine the challenges the U.S. Government experiences in planning to prevent or mitigate the effects of strategic shocks arising from threats of context, and provide recommendations on how it can improve its ability to prevent or mitigate strategic shocks when they do occur.
Strategic Shocks
As the example of the collapse of the Soviet Union illustrates, the occurrence of strategic shocks can have significant implications for nation-states and the international community at large. Whether the strategic shock is the collapse of a government, a devastating natural disaster, or a wealth destroying financial crisis, effectively forecasting strategic shocks can be difficult, and effectively responding to the events can be incredibly disruptive and expensive. Before looking at the sources of strategic shocks, it is important to define terms.
Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall suggest that despite the attendant astonishment when devastating surprises occur, they are in fact quite often inevitable.
The underlying causes or developing trends are frequently known, but have not received the requisite attention until the inevitable became either eminent or has occurred. 7 Schwartz and Randall describe strategic surprises as "game changing events" that have three key characteristics that separate them from run-of-the-mill surprises: they have "an important impact on an organization or country," they "challenge conventional wisdom" to such an extent that it is difficult to convince others that they are even possible, and it is difficult to imagine what actions can be taken in response. 8 When applied in a defense related construct, it is important to differentiate between the terms "defense-specific" and "defense-relevant" when applied to strategic shocks and the threats from which they arise. A defense-specific strategic shock is The contemporary strategic environment is increasingly volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Many defense leaders and strategists believe that the most likely and potentially the most dangerous security shocks will be unconventional in nature. That is, that they will be challenges that are not in the traditional war fighting construct, but arise from conditions and involve contingencies that are defense-relevant. This is logical given the dramatic decline in the incidence of traditional state-on-state warfare over the last two decades and a perceived increase in threats arising from the activities of non-state actors and conditions in the security environment. 12 Unconventional shocks by their very nature are difficult to foresee. They occur in a "blind spot" or "gap" where uncertainty reigns.
Freier suggests that unconventional defense-relevant shocks occur in "conceptual territory between the well considered and the purely speculative." 13 On the 5 planning continuum that extends from conventional contingencies to highly speculative but catastrophic events, DoD is well practiced at conducting planning for conventional contingencies and defense specific strategic surprises. At the far end of the spectrum where low likelihood, highly speculative but catastrophic shocks reside, some selective planning occurs. This is limited to events that can be envisioned and have such catastrophic effects that planning is deemed necessary as a hedge. An example of such planning is that conducted for a catastrophic meteor strike on Earth. 14 The gap between the conventional and highly speculative receives minimal consideration or planning effort, and it is here that Freier suggests the greatest potential resides for strategic shocks. It is in this gap that resides the "unconventional ground where irregular, catastrophic, and hybrid 'threats of purpose' and 'threats of context' rise and combine and is the likeliest source of strategic shock for the nation and its defense establishment." 15 
Threats of Purpose
Threats of purpose arise from the hostile design or intention of a foe that is intentionally acting to affect damage or harm. Threats of purpose may be either defense-specific or defense-relevant depending on whether military means are being employed. Defense-specific threats of purpose may be conventional or unconventional depending on the means or methods used by the foe. An example of a strategic shock triggered by a conventional defense-specific threat of purpose is the December 7, 1941, Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that brought the U.S. into World War II.
In today's security environment, unconventional shocks are perceived by many to be both more likely and more dangerous than conventional shocks. An example of an unconventional defense-relevant strategic shock arising from a threat of purpose is the The recent global recession serves to highlight the interconnectedness and fragility of the modern financial system. Globalization and increasingly linked trading markets and national economies have both contributed to the resilience of the international financial system and expanded the potential risk of shock across the system when there is a financial shock in one nation. The linked economies and financial networks have improved the ability of nations and external investors to provide assistance when there is a market anomaly or a financial crisis in a nation. This system of interconnected markets and economies has also increased the risk of spreading the shock across the system. In the past when a nation's economy failed, the effects were localized. In today's globalized economy, other parties are able to assist in staving off economic failure, but may also experience the financial shocks. increasing incidences of extreme weather events in certain regions of the world. In combination, they could produce levels of human misery that may challenge the capabilities of already fragile states. 24 Strategies to prevent or mitigate the occurrences of complex disasters must be multifaceted solutions to address the multiple complex issues at play. Having examined some of the different forms that threats of context may take, now let us examine how they may manifest themselves as strategic shocks.
Freier suggests there are two distinct paths to a defense-relevant shock. The first is a "rapid, unanticipated arrival" at a dangerous waypoint or endpoint of a "wellrecognized and perilous trend line." 25 This would suggest some significant change has occurred in the environment or condition that has precipitated the arrival of the shock.
Defense-relevant shock can also arrive by a more difficult to predict "Black Swan," a label that Nassim Taleb coined and that he defines as an outlier event, beyond the realm of regular expectation and carrying an extreme impact. Despite its status as an outlier, after its occurrence there are attempts to provide a context or explanation for why it happened. 26 Freier explains Black Swans as events that are "discontinuous breaks from trends altogether." 27 Black Swans will occur in the future, and despite the prognostications of clairvoyants, they will be shocks that occur with little to no warning.
There is often little that can be done to prevent them. Shocks that occur as a way point or endpoint on a trend line can be forecasted, but forecasting and acting on the forecasts present challenges for decision makers.
The critical first step in developing an effective method of managing the gap from which strategic shocks originate is an institutional recognition of the threat they pose to U.S. interests and national security, and a commitment to integrate consideration of strategic shocks into national security planning. Recent indications by policy makers and initial steps toward conducting scenario-based studies examining strategic shocks indicate that the national security establishment has begun to break from its pre-9/11 views of national security as being focused on the purposeful threats posed by adversaries to a more comprehensive view of national security that incorporates the need to recognize and plan for threats of context. 28 To facilitate management of the strategic gap, security leaders must systematize the consideration of and planning for strategic shocks in strategic planning processes.
Max Bazerman and Michael Watkins, in their book
Predictable Surprises, provide a useful framework for considering how we should approach the consideration of strategic shocks. 29 They also illustrate some of the obstacles to effectively incorporating planning for strategic shocks. In Blindside, Francis Fukuyama covers much of the same intellectual territory with a specific focus on national security. 30 Defense strategy and planning have historically been very conservative. The DoD as an institution has focused almost exclusively on threats of purpose, and in this regard it has been challenged to break from convention to imagine the unconventional threats the nation faces in the future.
Policy makers must develop and institutionalize systematic processes to scan the environment in order to gather data and conduct analysis. Because shocks could arise from many different sources and manifest in different ways, this will require a whole-ofgovernment approach to leverage the expertise resident in the different departments to provide a comprehensive interdisciplinary approach. In order to truly make this process effective, it may be necessary to reorganize the national security system to break down the bureaucratic barriers that continue to exist in the interagency. The identification of anomalies and trends in a given area may in isolation be unremarkable, but in combination with other trends or data points may provide indications of the potential for strategic shock. The establishment of mechanisms to filter and integrate the disparate data flows into a holistic picture will be critical in forecasting strategic shocks. To guide collectors and analysts, it will be critical to visualize and develop scenarios of potential strategic shocks that break from current mental models, particularly those involving threats of context, that will enable identification of threat indicators.
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Identification of real risks from the constant stream of background noise will require overcoming a number of cognitive hurdles. Humans tend to undervalue future risks. Given the myriad threats and crisis that the National Security Staff (NSS) deals with daily, there is a natural tendency to discount the future. 32 Imagination and extrapolation into the future is critical. This is a challenge for an NSS that is focused on current crisis, policy development, and staff support for the president. The NSS needs the capability to look into the future, develop and evaluate scenarios, and design long term prevention or mitigation strategies.
In analyzing potential strategic shocks, it is essential to identify trends that can be monitored and critical waypoints where reexamination or decision might be required. As trend lines become clearer and risks are better understood, it will be prudent to develop strategies to hedge risk. The development of hedge strategies may be very challenging
as it may prove difficult to develop solutions to problems that have not manifested themselves. The development and decision to implement a hedge strategy is complex 13 and challenging. Policy makers must overcome the willingness to accept low probabilities of risk in the future with ill-defined costs, rather than accepting a sure cost now. 33 It is challenging to make significant investments, particularly in a fiscally constrained environment, for a future benefit whose value may be marginally understood. Both personally and institutionally, there is a bias toward the status quo that must be overcome. 34 Where systems still function, there is little catalyst for change other than leadership.
In a world of threats and competing demands for government resources, funding of hedge strategies will prove challenging. 35 In a political system that allocates resources, action often requires a constituency. In our political system, with defense industries that actively advocate programs that support procurement of their products, The violence committed by the cartels has caused increasing levels of insecurity in
Mexican cities and has, in many instances, caused deterioration in the capabilities of local and regional governments to effectively govern and secure the population against cartel violence. levels. 40 The number of asylum requests is particularly remarkable given that there were no Mexican requests for asylum in the 1990s. 41 Despite the increase in requests for asylum, the U.S. grants only a small number of the requests; for example, granting only 165 of 2010's 3231 Mexican requests for asylum. 42 The escalating levels of violence in 
2) A dramatic increase in the number of educated and prosperous Mexicans fleeing
Mexico and applying for asylum in the U.S. 45 This would indicate that the already poor security situation in some parts of Mexico is deteriorating. Whether due to narcoviolence itself or associated criminal activity such as kidnapping, this trend would signal that the most prosperous and productive portions of Mexican society lack confidence in the government's ability to sustain or win its campaign against the cartels.
3) A sudden decline in the Mexican economy associated with drug violence. 46 The economy of Mexico has already suffered significant effects from drug violence. Gabriel 4) A significant increase in violence aimed at national politicians in Mexico. 48 An increase in the targeting of national level politicians would be an indicator that the cartels have grown more aggressive in targeting high level government officials. This may be a result of aggressive Government of Mexico actions toward cartels, but this trend must be monitored as it may be a lead indicator that the Government of Mexico is under increasing cartel pressure and may be susceptible to policy changes.
5)
Indications that the capital of Mexico City has become a zone of insecurity. 49 To date Mexico City has generally experienced low levels of cartel violence and activity.
Escalation in levels of violence in the capital may be an indicator that security in previously unaffected areas has deteriorated or that the cartels are either increasingly desperate or have become emboldened. Ongoing high levels of violence may increase pressure on the Government of Mexico to modify its anti-cartel strategies.
U.S. Challenges in Developing a Strategic Response
Developing a strategy to prevent or mitigate the strategic shock associated with the scenario of a mass migration of Mexican nationals because of deteriorating security caused by escalating cartel violence presents significant challenges for the U.S.
Government.
To develop a strategy to prevent or mitigate a potential strategic shock, the first challenge is recognizing the potential for strategic shock. Given the decades long U.S.
efforts to stem Mexican illegal immigration and the smuggling/trafficking of illegal drugs from Mexico, and the elevated levels of narco-violence that have occurred in Mexico since the 1990s, it may be difficult to recognize that a fundamental change in the nature of the problem has occurred. It is also challenging for decision makers to recognize that deteriorating trends may create the potential for shock. A NSS that is focused on the daily management of global crises will be challenged to identify and act on a future shock.
Because the effects of narco-violence and related immigration are concentrated in the states adjacent to the border, there are organizational and political barriers that must be overcome before implementing preventative or mitigating measures. The politicization of national immigration policy only complicates the challenges of recognizing and acting to prevent the potential for this strategic shock.
The NSS must be the integrator and manager of the interagency system, a place where disparate trends can be monitored and integrated into a comprehensive analysis of threats. This requires both a willingness on the part of members of the interagency to share data and analysis and a capacity in the NSS to analyze trends and integrate them into comprehensive threat analysis. This will be critical in monitoring the trends associated with the potential for mass migration. Because separate departments will be monitoring the trends that fall in their portfolio, the NSS must be where the separate trends are integrated to achieve an understanding of an approaching shock that requires planning to develop preventative or mitigating strategies. This management capability is lacking in the current NSS.
The most significant challenge in developing a strategy to prevent or mitigate this potential strategic shock is that it will require a whole-of-government strategy because it will require the synchronized actions of different elements of the government through the interagency system. Since the challenges of the narco-refugee scenario affect law enforcement, border and immigration control, the public health system, local and state governments, local and national economies, national security, and relations between the governments of the United States and Mexico, a comprehensive response will be required.
Developing whole-of-government solutions has historically been very challenging for the U.S. Government. The interagency system was developed to meet Cold War requirements and has not been adapted to meet the new realities of today's global challenges. COL (Retired) Jack LeCuyer states that the departments and agencies in the interagency system "continue to resist these integrative (collaborative) whole-ofgovernment efforts." 50 The agencies and departments jealously guard their resources and are resistant to linking those resources to whole-of-government plans that involve multi-year efforts because they have little bureaucratic incentive to do so. The NSS, which oversees the interagency, has little authority or ability short of presidential directive to lead the development of effective strategies against emerging threats because it "remains focused almost exclusively on policy development, staffing the president, and crisis management rather than the long-term strategic view". 51 Aside from the bureaucratic turf battles that inhibit the development of an effective strategy, there is also a lack of capability to conduct effective strategic planning. LeCuyer states that a "government-wide lack of strategic planning and interagency operational planning capabilities among civilian agencies" is one of the most cited problems of the current interagency system. 52 The NSS and interagency must develop an effective strategic planning capability that integrates all the elements of national power into strategies to prevent or mitigate looming strategic shocks. Global Water Security" assesses that "during the next 10 years, water problems will contribute to instability in states important to US national security." 54 In the Middle East Region, which is perhaps the world's most water stressed region and more than 90 percent of the useable water crosses international boundaries, it is already a source of 22 instability. 55 In 1990, during a particularly dry period, King Hussein of Jordan stated that the only reason that might bring Jordan into a war again was water. 56 For the nations sharing the water resources and aquifers of the Jordan River Valley, access to and control of water resources has been a source tension and conflict for decades. The water resources shared by Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian Territories, and Syria are already insufficient to meet human demands for freshwater. 57 The growing populations of the riparian states, increased industrial and agricultural consumption, in combination with deteriorating quality of groundwater in aquifers are increasing tensions between the states. In this region that has already experienced multiple conflicts between both states and peoples; the pursuit of a final and enduring peace settlement that meets the interests of all parties has lasted years. Achieving this enduring peace will be elusive without addressing the water resource issues in the region, which while not a direct source of the conflict, are a significant complicating factor. The growing tensions over water resources could serve as a catalyst for conflict in the region in the near future.
The Middle East region is extremely arid and faces a constant scarcity of water due to meteorological, geographic, and demographic factors. The rainy season is short, with rainfall of 250-400mm annually, and is insufficient for meeting basic agricultural requirements of the region. 58 The principal source of usable water for the region is the Jordan River and its tributaries. Palestinian Gaza Strip. 63 The aquifers suffer from overutilization due to the inability of rainfall recharge to replenish water drawn from the aquifers. This in combination with sea water intrusion has caused rising salinity levels, particularly in the Coastal Aquifer.
Both aquifers also suffer from increasing penetration of agricultural chemicals and pesticides and the seepage of sewage that have deteriorated the quality of the groundwater. Much of the deteriorating of water quantity and quality can be attributed to the increased usage caused by dramatic population increases in the region. The result is a classic story of supply and demand. The region is experiencing a declining usable supply of water in the face of rapidly growing demand. Given the historical animosity between the peoples and their past history of conflict, the increasing strain over water suggests that a shock is on the horizon if nothing is done.
Implications for U.S. Interests
The U.S. interest in the region is in maintaining stability and supporting our strategic partners, Israel and the Kingdom of Jordan. The U.S. has played an active role in the region for decades, mediating during conflicts and brokering peace negotiations in an attempt to achieve a final and lasting peace. Israel and Jordan are both U.S. trade partners as well as partners in maintaining stability in the region.
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The unresolved conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, and U.S. support for the defense of Israel are complicating factors in U.S. efforts to maintain stability in the greater Middle East. The U.S. efforts to facilitate a peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians have made little progress in recent years.
As environmental conditions in the region deteriorate and competition for access and control over water resources increase, the parties affected will look to the U.S. for assistance in mediating disagreements and for assistance in developing and resourcing solutions to the problem. Should the situation grow more acute and lead to conflict, the world will expect the U.S. to play a central role in reestablishing peace and developing solutions to address regional environmental challenges.
Trends/Indicators
There are a number of trends that can be monitored to determine whether the competition for water resources is reaching crisis levels in the region and may perhaps lead to conflict. tensions to the brink of war between the super-powers, it will be difficult to garner support. Given the political division in U.S. politics and the economic challenges our government and society face, convincing the Congress and U.S. public of the need for U.S. action will be a tough sell. Given the power that the Israeli lobby wields in Congress, it is easy to anticipate special interest groups attempting to avert any U.S.
action. For those unable to see the consequences of future strategic shock in the Middle East, there seems little catalyst to change the status quo in this trouble region.
Changing the Status Quo
To effectively forecast, plan for, and manage strategies to prevent or mitigate future strategic shocks, particularly those arising from threats of context, it is clear that change is required in the U.S. national security establishment. We have seen in our examinations of strategic shock scenarios that the U.S. Government lacks an effective strategic planning process for national security. It lacks an interagency process that is able to effectively assess the future challenges of the international strategic environment and develop and manage whole-of-government strategies to address those challenges. Many have studied and written on the problem, including the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), 70 Colonel (Retired) Jack LeCuyer, and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy Michele Flournoy, and their writings provide a number of recommendations to change the status quo and prepare the U.S.
for the many challenges presented by the complex security environment of the future, particularly emerging strategic shocks. 71 Their important recommendations are too extensive to cover in this study, but do directly address the deficiencies in the national security establishment that were identified in the examination of the strategic shock scenarios above. The most important avenues for action are discussed below.
As a nation we must fundamentally redefine national security. We must step away from our Cold War lineage that defined national security in the context of a military foe. We must expand our construct of national security to include the myriad threats found in today's volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous environment, to include consideration of the disruptions posed by potential strategic shocks such as pandemics, natural disasters, financial contagion, and climate change.
We must recognize that to effectively plan for and manage the newly expanded portfolio of national security threats; we must design processes that support the development and implementation of whole-of-government solutions. Only by harnessing and integrating the efforts of all government departments and agencies will we be able to identify future over the horizon threats. Our nation requires mechanisms to develop the interagency system into one with the requisite authorities and capabilities to prepare for and respond to future potential threats. To achieve improvements in the interagency system, the NSS must be reengineered and professionalized.
The NSS must evolve beyond its advisory role to the president to effectively serve as the manager of national security. In additional to expanding its ability to manage crisis, it must develop the ability to effectively scan the national security environment and forecast future threats. Only with expanded capabilities will the NSS be able to conduct analysis on future threat scenarios, identify and monitor trends, and conduct effective risk assessment that can then drive strategic planning.
Central to doing all this is redesigning our resource allocation mechanisms to break down bureaucratic barriers within departments and agencies and incentivize active support for the interagency process and make it as responsive and integrated as it needs to be.
Conclusion
The national security environment has grown increasing volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous with threats no longer arising solely from traditional military foes. Increasingly, threats to national security will be unconventional threats of context that arise from the environment. These threats will include dangerous strategic shocks with catastrophic effects that require the rapid reorientation of national priorities. In order to effectively plan for and respond to these threats, an integrated whole-of-government response will be required.
